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Introduction  
In Spain, welfare has historically incorporated some of the most characteristic features of 
the continental 'conservative corporatist' model of social policy (Esping-Andersen, 1990). In 
the last two decades, an incrementalist pattern has developed concerning welfare services 
and income policies alongside some inherited corporatist practices --despotic and 
democratic-- from both late Francoism and the transitional period to democracy (1976-79), 
respectively. 
Spain has reconstructed a medium-size system of social protection as compared to the 
countries of the European Union. At present the Spanish Welfare State represents a 
fundamental structure for both social reproduction and political legitimisation[1]. Since its 
accession to the European Community (1986), Spain has followed a pattern of 
convergence in welfare of a three-fold nature: a universalisation of social entitlements 
(education, health, pensions); a confluence of welfare spending to the median of its 
European partners; and a diversification in the provision of social services by private and 
subsidised organisations. 
Thus, the Spanish Welfare State can be labelled as a via media with respect to other 
existing welfare systems (Moreno & Sarasa, 1992, 1993). Indeed, the welfare system in 
Spain incorporates elements of both Bismarckian and Beveridgean traditions, or rather 
between bread-winner 'continental' and citizenship-centred 'liberal' models. It also 
represents a middle way of de-commodification and gendering, and of universal and 
means-tested access to services and benefits. Policies carried out according to targeting 
criteria have had a 'ripple effect' upon worse-off categories expanding the 'grey zones' 
between both social insurance and welfare assistance realms.  
In Spain, liberalisation in the provision of welfare services is noticeable in a certain 
extension of free-market morals and, thus, in the proliferation of 'non-profit' -but 
characteristically subsidised-NGOs, and the reinforcement of the process of welfare 
privatisation. However, a trend away from 'residualism' and a parallel growth of institutional 
'stateness', or state penetration of the welfare sphere (Flora, 1986/87; Kuhnle, 1997), can 
be also detected. In fact some reforms of universalisation (education, health pensions) 
have been put into effect in recent years encompassing some basic entitlements with 
traditional income related programmes.  
The South European model of welfare  
In recent times, a distinct model of South European welfare (Greece, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain) has been contended (Ferrera, 1996a/b; Moreno, 1996). The discussion revolves 
around on whether the Mediterranean type of welfare is constituted by a family of 
nations' (Castles, 1993) lagging behind those of the 'continental' model to which they 
belong (Katrougalos, 1996), or else it is a mere 'Latin rim' characterised by a rudimentary 
level of social provision and institutional development (Leibfried, 1992; Langan & Ostner, 
1991; Gough, 1996).  
Further comparative research is needed in order to substantiate those claims for a distinct 
Mediterranean welfare regime. Unlike the Scandinavian or Anglo-Saxon typologies, cross-
national studies including Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain are lacking. A good few issues 
deserve a closer examination which could help us to define the overall picture of a Latin 
type of welfare. However, there is an analytical common ground to be explored. 
The four South European countries share analogies regarding historical backgrounds, 
value-systems, and institutional peculiarities. They all had past experiences of authoritarian 
and dictatorial rule (for longer periods in the case of Portugal and Spain), and have suffered 
from economic and industrial 'delays' in the processes of modernisation (except for early-
industrialised areas in Italy and Spain) (Giner, 1995). The religious factor has had a 
structuring role in all four countries, but the role of the Church as main organiser of social 
protection has diminished. This feature seems to correspond with a higher degree of 
secularisation in the social practices of Southern Europe. The impact of europeanisation 
and globalisation have brought about, respectively, increasing incentives to economic 
convergence with Northern and Central Europe (Economic and Monetary Union), and 
world-trade pressures to restrict social programmes (social dumping from less-developed 
countries). In broad terms similar social-demographic trends and macro-economic 
constraints can be observed in all four South European countries. 
As concerns the cultural-axiological dimension of welfare development, a self-perception of 
differentiated needs and lifestyles is observable (intra-familial pooling of resources, home 
ownership, heterogeneity of social reproduction), with a compelling household solidarity 
and a pre-eminence of values of family inclusion and life-cycle redistribution (gift 
mechanisms, processes of age emancipation, proliferation of family companies and jobs). 
Moreover, cultural choices and practices have structured their civil societies in a 
characteristic mode (social networking, patronage, clientelism, group predation). 
On analysing politico-institutional development the pivotal role of the family in social 
protection cannot be over-emphasised. In Southern Europe the welfare state is to a large 
extent the Mediterranean welfare family. Intra-familial transfers are both material and 
immaterial. Concerning the latter, the involvement of women to both elderly and children 
care is crucial. However, the increasing participation of female workers in the labour force, 
coupled with new burdens for family formation and expansion, raise big questions as 
whether Mediterranean welfare can survive as we know it at present. 
Also characteristic of Southern European labour markets is an apparent cleavage between 
'insiders' (hyper-protected core workforce), 'peripheral' (in- between gainfully employed) 
and 'outsiders' (precarious, 'left-outs', and 'junk' labourers). There are fragmented systems 
of income guarantees and wide inter-generation disparities in cash benefits (e.g. 
overprotection of the elderly in Greece and Italy). 
The informal 'tax-free' economies in Southern Europe are large (estimates of the 'hidden' 
sector range from 15 to 25 per cent of GDP). This translates into an uneven distribution of 
financial burdens across the various occupational groups. Needy and honest contributors 
are penalised and vice versa. When targeting social policies to groups facing poverty and 
exclusion (Abrahamson, 1997), the 'Matthew Effect' is also perceived as providing 
disproportionate advantages for those with information resources over those who are 
entitled to benefits but lack of know-how and/or patronage network[2].  
Both Mediterranean welfare mix and the gender/family/work nexus are adaptable and 
complementary. These practices often translate into institutional particularism and low 
efficiency in service provision. A greater number in the production/provision of social 
services are carried out by publicly subsidised organisations rather than subsidiary private 
and/or voluntary associations. In all four South European countries there are limitations to 
comprehensive reforms (implementation of a centrally run safety-net). However new 
approaches to welfare re-construction are gradually replacing traditional voluntaristic 
attitudes deployed by both powerful subcultures of the political Left (Socialists and 
Communists).  
In the case of Spain, the most relevant aspect of its welfare development is constituted by 
the effects of the deep process of decentralisation both at the level of planning and policy 
implementation. The institutional outcome of the interplay between central, regional, and 
local governments will respond to the very nature of a contractually open process of power 
accommodation. Institutional uncertainty goes hand in hand with a gradual federalisation of 
politics in Spain (Moreno, 1997a).  
Social expenditure trends  
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the growth of public expenditure in Spain was similar to 
that of the OECD countries during the 1960s and 1970s. Furthermore, in none of the OECD 
countries has public spending increased as much as in Spain since 1975. Public spending 
grew from 26 per cent of the GDP in 1975 to over 47 per cent in 1995. Table 1 reproduces 
data concerning total public expenditure as a percentage share of GDP during 1980-92. 
Note that in this period, all South European countries more than doubled the percentage 
growth for the EU-12. Increases in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain reached 16.2 per cent, 
11.3 per cent, 20.2 per cent, and 13.1 per cent, respectively. These rates compare to the 
mean 5.4 per cent for all EU countries. Already in the second half of the 1980s, the Spanish 
public expenditure per capita, measured in relative purchasing units, was similar to 
equivalent mean figures in Germany, Italy, France, and the United Kingdom.  
During the period of the PSOE Governments (1982-1996), the growth in public spending 
was aimed to be managed by: (a) A restraining in the instrumentalisation of social policies 
as the means of expanding the economy; (b) A re-adjustment of the proportion of public, 
private, and associative sectors in running the economic activities, and (c), An emphasis on 
efficiency ethics so that public managers and decision-makers could maximise the use of 
public moneys (Borrell, 1988). All things considered, Spain confronted a period of constant 
increases in public expenditure at a higher level --in relative terms-- than most of the 
European countries. This was the result of providing the means to cover new and costly 
social programmes (universalisation of education, public health and pensions). But, above 
all, it was aimed at accomplishing the objective of bringing economic modernisation in line 
with the rest of the EEC/EU countries. Public finances were greatly conditioned by the 
substantial governmental intervention in the economy through subsidies for purposes of 
industrial re-structuring and for the development of a comprehensive programme of public 
works and infrastructure (highways, railway, telecommunications). 
In broad terms, the policies of modernisation implemented by the Socialist Governments 
reflected the desire for europeanisation expressed by the Spanish population at large. 
Since the accession of Spain to the EEC (1985) the general feeling in the country has 
invariably been one of convergence with the rest of its European partners. This social 
consensus[3] has remained a factor of paramount importance in Spanish politics and 
greatly explains the legitimacy of the often harsh economic measures carried out by the 
government in the last years.  
Since the transitional period to democracy (1975-1979) the growth of public expenditure in 
Spain has not been covered adequately by equivalent increases accrued by the general tax 
collection. This has provoked a relatively high level of public debt, a pattern of fiscal crisis 
common to various degrees in UE countries. However, Spain ranked fifth in 1993 as the 
EU-12 member state with a lowest ratio of public debt: 55.9 per cent as a percentage of 
GDP. This figure compares with minimum rates of 6.8 per cent and 43.9 in the cases of 
Luxembourg and France, and a maximum of 145.2 per cent in Greece (the percentages for 
Italy and Portugal were 118.3 and 66.6 per cent, respectively). Table 2 reproduces figures 
of public debt and deficits in EU countries[4]. 
Table 1: Total Public Expenditure in EU countries (1980-86-92) 
(as percentage of GDP)  
1980 1986 1992 
Austria 48.1 51.6 50.2 
Belgium 51.9 54.1 59.2 
Denmark 56.2 55.7 59.2 
Finland 35.5 40.7 51.7 
France 46.1 51.3 52.0 
Germany 47.9 46.4 49.2 
Ireland 50.5 54.1 43.9 
Netherlands 54.8 56.6 54.7 
Sweden 60.1 61.6 67.3 
United Kingdom 42.9 42.5 44.1 
Total Europe 45.4 48.6 50.7 
Greece 33.2 47.7 48.3 
Italy 41.9 50.7 53.2 
Portugal 35.9 44.0 46.1 
Spain 32.0 40.7 45.1 
Source: OECD. 
Table 2: Public debts and deficits in EU-12 countries  
(as percentage of GDP) 
Gross Government Debt Net borrowing (-) 
1980 1993 % change Average 1980-92 
Belgium 78.8 142.2 63.4 -8.8 
Denmark 39.9 80.4 40.5 -2.5 
France 20.1 43.9 23.8 -2.3 
Germany 31.8 48.9 17.1 -2.2 
Ireland 70.8 99.0 28.2 -7.7 
Luxembourg 13.8 6.8 7.0 2.7 
Netherlands 47.6 81.2 33.6 -4.9 
United Kingdom 54.3 48.2 -6.1 -2.7 
EU12 39.0 66.0 27.0 -4.4 
Greece 28.8 145.2 116.4 -11.9 
The annual rate of growth of the GDP between 1970-75 was 5.2 per cent while the social 
expenditure increased 9.7 per cent. In the period 1975-80 social expenses grew annually at 
8.9 per cent whereas the GDP did at a rate of 1.8 per cent. Figures on social spending for 
the period 1980-92 are reproduced in Table 3 (measurement criteria by Eurostat). Note that 
all South European countries increased their social expenditure at a higher rate than the 
mean figure of 2.7 per cent for EU-12: 7.1 per cent, Greece; 6.2 per cent, Italy; 2.9; 
Portugal; and 4.4 per cent, Spain. 
According to OECD criteria, in 1983 social spending already reached 24 per cent of the 
Spanish GDP. However, and due to a different structure of expenditure allocation, the 
coverage of those expenses related to social policy programmes (education, housing, and 
pensions) were smaller than in the countries above referred to. Both bureaucracy and 
financial transfers granted mainly to mining and agricultural sectors were higher compared 
to equivalent figures in core European countries (Lagares, 1988). 
Recently, as has happened in other advanced industrial countries, bureaucratic 'muddling 
through' in Spain has been responsible to a considerable degree for the incrementalist 
nature of public expenditure growth. Nevertheless, the various political inputs carried out by 
successive democratic governments since the demise of Francoism have greatly 
determined the changing allocation of funds within the budgetary structure of Spanish 
public expenditure.  
In the period 1980-92, social spending increased 4.37 per cent its share in the Spanish 
GDP. Table 4 reproduces data regarding the functional breakdown of social expenditure 
composite in percentages of the GDP. The entries corresponding to sickness, old-age and 
unemployment add up to three quarters of all the increases in social spending. In fact 
Italy 57.8 118.3 60.5 -10.7 
Portugal 37.2 66.6 29.4 -7.4 
Spain 17.5 55.9 38.4 -4.4 
Source: Ferrera (1996a: Table 7). 
Table 3: Social Expenditure in the EU countries  
(as percentage of GDP) 
1980 1986 1992 s (1980-92) 
Belgium 28.0 29.4 27.8 -0.2 
Denmark 28.7 26.7 31.4 2.7 
France 25.4 28.5 29.2 3.8 
Germany 28.7 28.1 26.6* -2.1 
Ireland 21.6 24.1 21.6 0.0 
Luxembourg 26.5 24.8 28.0 1.5 
Netherlands 30.8 30.9 33.0 2.2 
United Kingdom 21.5 24.3 27.2 5.7 
EU 12 24.4 26.0 27.1 2.7 
Greece 12.2 19.4 19.3 7.1 
Italy 19.4 22.4 25.6 6.2 
Portugal 14.7 16.3 17.6 2.9 
Spain 18.1 19.5 22.5 4.4 
* 1991. Source: Eurostat, 1993. 
expenses for these three functions comprised 71.3 per cent of the total. Maternity and 
family expenses decreased notably. This pattern seems to reinforce the interpretation of 
households as fundamental components of the Spanish welfare state and subject to 
multiple and varied demands.  
As in most continental Europe, social welfare in Spain has been traditionally designed to 
secure 'income maintenance' to those citizens who have made contributions to the social 
security system during their working life. The financing of social protection spending is met 
in its larger part by both employers' and employees' contributions (see Table 5 for figures 
regarding EU-12). However, a significant shift has been taken place in recent years with a 
gradual transferring of public moneys from the national budget to the social security 
accounts. This is particularly relevant as regards pensions (non-contributory) and health 
care. These are two of the main reforms in the Spanish Welfare State on which we focus 
our attention in the next section. 
Table 4: Distribution of main categories of social protection (1980-86-92)  
(by categories and as percentage of both GDP and social expenditure) 
1980 1986 1992 
% GDP % SE % GDP % SE % GDP % SE 
Sickness 4.69 25.60 4.54 22.92 5.59 24.65 
Disability 1.37 7.48 1.59 8.04 1.84 8.12 
W. Accidents 0.44 2.41 0.40 2.01 0.51 2.26 
Old Age 5.42 29.59 6.47 32.66 6.71 29.58 
Survivors 1.80 9.85 1.89 9.53 2.26 9.97 
Maternity 0.25 1.36 0.21 1.05 0.20 0.88 
Family 0.52 2.85 0.24 1.21 0.20 0.88 
Emp. Promo. 0.11 0.61 0.16 0.82 0.21 0.91 
Unemploy. 2.73 14.91 3.23 16.29 3.87 17.05 
Housing 0.00 ---- 0.03 0.15 0.16 0.72 
Administr. 0.67 3.65 0.80 4.06 0.86 3.79 
Miscellan. 0.31 1.70 0.25 1.26 0.27 1.21 
Total 18.31 100.00 19.80 100.00 22.68 100.00 
Source: Rodríguez Cabrero, 1994 (Tables 9.46/9.47). 
Table 5: Contributions as a percentage of social protection spending (1992) 
Employers' 
contributions 
Employees' 
contributions 
Total  
contributions 
Belgium 35 27 62 
Denmark 7 5 12 
France 51 29 88 
Germany 40 30 70 
Ireland 23 15 38 
Luxembourg 30 22 52 
Netherlands 20 42 62 
United Kingdom 26 16 42 
Greece* 47 27 74 
Italy 51 16 67 
Portugal 42 21 63 
Reforms and future scenarios  
The impact that education reforms have had in the aggregate of social welfare is to be 
underlined. Fifteen years after the first changes introduced in educational public system 
their re-distributive effects are evident. To a degree still to be assessed, such an impact has 
considerably affected the mechanisms of social reproduction ingrained in a liberal-
meritocratic ideology. The extension of means-tested schemes of grants has also 
reinforced social re-distribution. 
The universalisation of the educational system has translated into education coverage of 
100 per cent of the population in the 4-15-year age group[5]. In 1992, educational coverage 
of women was higher for age groups ranging from 16 to 29 years. It is particularly worth 
noting that 63 per cent women were receiving formal education as compared to 53 per cent 
of men. Furthermore, there was a difference of over 8 percentage points concerning the 20-
24 year-olds (see Table 6 for educational coverage by gender and age groups).  
The four areas of our subsequent analyses carry the main bulk of social expenditure: 
'Pensions', 'Health care', 'Unemployment and employment promotion', and 'Social 
assistance and targeting'. In Table 7 a selection of five categories related to social 
protection spending in the EU-12 countries is reproduced. As far as the South European 
countries is concerned, a look at these data reveals two main deviations: Social expenses 
under 'Old-age and survivors' in Italy (15.4 per cent) and under 'Unemployment benefits' in 
Spain (4.8 per cent) are disproportionately higher than to the EU-12 mean figures. In fact 
those percentages are highest of all EU-12 countries considered. These findings tell us a 
great deal about the most pressing challenges facing both Italy and Spain with relation to 
welfare financing. Now, let us turn to examine the four areas above mentioned. 
Spain 53 17 70 
* 1991 statistics. Source: Eurostat. 
Table 6: Educational coverage by gender and age groups (1980-92) 
1980 1992 
Women Men Both Women Men Both 
16-19 44.8 42.9 43.7 63.3 52.8 57.9 
20-24 16.9 15.3 16.0 34.9 26.5 30.6 
25-29 1.9 3.5 2.7 11.3 10.4 10.8 
Source: Spanish 'Active Population Survey'. 
Table 7: Main categories of social protection expenditure in EU-12 (1993)  
(as percentage of GDP)  
Old age & 
survivors 
Sickness Unemploy. 
benefits 
Disability Family 
Belgium 11.9 6.0 2.6 2.9 1.9 
Denmark 11.0 6.0 4.1 3.0 3.3 
France 12.7 7.7 2.0 2.2 2.0 
Germany 12.1 8.0 2.0 3.5 2.2 
Ireland 5.7 6.1 3.0 1.5 2.2 
Luxembourg 11.2 5.9 0.2 3.5 2.7 
Netherlands 11.9 7.1 2.9 7.2 1.6 
U. Kingdom 10.8 5.1 1.6 3.1 2.6 
EU 12 11.9 6.5 1.9 2.4 1.8 
Pensions  
As a consequence of the mobilisation led by the Spanish Trade Unions, which culminated 
in the General Strike of 14th December, 1988, large increases in pensions -as well as 
unemployment benefits-took place subsequently. Subsequently, there was a reinforcement 
of the pattern of expenditure growth since the beginning of the 1980s. With the 
implementation of the 'Non-contributory Pensions Act', in 1990, coverage for both old-age 
(over 65 years) and disability pensions (over 65 per cent for citizens between 18 and 65 
years) became universal[6]. Note that in the period 1980-92, the number of pensioners rose 
by 2,6 million (2,1, contributory, and 0.5, non-contributory), from 6,6 to 7,2 million, and the 
total expenditure increased from 5.9 per cent (5.8 per cent, contributory, and 0.1 per cent, 
non-contributory) to 8.6 per cent (8.1 per cent, contributory, and 0.5, non-contributory) as 
percentage of the GDP. Average Social Security pension benefits increased from 66.5 per 
cent of the minimum salary in 1980 to 93.3 per cent in 1992. Non-contributory (social 
assistance) pensions were 53.3 per cent of the minimum salary in 1992[7] (Cruz Roche, 
1994). Table 8 reflects the evolution in the number of pensions in Spain for the period 
1980-92. 
Spain has gone through significant demographic changes in recent times. Population is 
nearly 40 million with a mere annual growth rate of 0.2 per cent since the beginning of the 
1980s. The main reason for such sluggish increase of the population is the decline of 
fertility rates since the 1970s: 3.0 per cent in 1965; 2.8 per cent in 1970, 2.1 per cent in 
1980 (a percentage lower than the required to ensure generation replacement), and 1.23 in 
1992 (the lowest in Europe). In parallel, the proportion of the population aged 65 or over 
grew from 10.9 per cent of the total in 1980 to 13.2 per cent by 1990[8].  
Italy and Greece are well above the EU mean percentage of 62.0 per cent for the per capita
average old-age pension (77.6 per cent and 78.8 per cent in 1991, respectively). This is not 
the case of Spain and Portugal (47.3 per cent and 42.1 per cent, respectively) with a more 
balanced inter-generation distribution of resources[9] (see Table 9 for 'intensity rates' of old-
age pensions in Europe, those being defined as average benefits per head as percentage 
of the GDP). However, a general concern about the 'uncontrolled' increase of pensions with 
relation to the GDP growth was behind the modification of the criteria in the annual re-
Greece 10.2 2.3 0.5 1.5 0.1 
Italy 15.4 5.4 0.5 2.2 0.8 
Portugal 7.0 5.3 0.8 2.4 0.8 
Spain 9.4 5.9 4.8 2.3 0.2 
Source: European Commission, 1995. 
Table 8: Evolution in the number of pensions in Spain (1980-92)  
(in thousands) 
1980 1986 1992 
Old Age 2,190 2,536 3,009 
Disability 1,024 1,490 1,629 
Widowed 1,027 1,338 1,678 
Orphanage 138 158 166 
Non-contributory 359 362 717 
Miscellaneous 19 24 28 
Total 4,757 5,908 7,227 
Source: Spanish Ministry of Labour and Social Security. 
valuing of benefits (forecast rate instead of past inflation rate), and a tightening of 
requirements for contributory pensions.  
A more restrictive criteria in the definition of disability, together with a closer overall 
administrative control, reduced considerably the acute increase of this type of pensions up 
until 1985[10]. The process in Spain has been somewhat different from that of the Italian 
case where clientelismo and connivance between employers and prospective claimants are 
among the causes for the highest public spending in the European Union for the categories 
of 'Disability' and 'Old-age and survivors' put together (Ferrera, 1995).  
Health care  
The 1986 General Health Act was committed to the development of a National Health 
Service which guaranteed the right to health care for all Spaniards and all foreigner citizens 
resident in Spain. Coverage, which was already very high in 1980 (83.1 per cent for all 
citizens and residents), was almost total by 1991 (99.8 per cent). (Almeda & Sarasa, 1996).
Three quarters of the financing of Spanish health is public. Of the remaining one quarter, 85 
per cent are direct payments by individuals (mostly for private care and medicines). These 
figures have kept stable during the 1980-93 period. But the most significant variation of this 
period is reflected in the shift of the financing of public expenditure from contributions to 
taxation. In 1980, as much as 82 per cent of all spending on health was met by social 
contributions, whereas in 1993 the corresponding figure was 20 per cent (see Table 10). 
This dramatic change is in line with the assumption that universalisation of the public health 
service should be related to a system of general financing by taxation on the basis of a 
more equitable philosophy.  
Table 9: Intensity of old age protection in the EU-12 countries  
(average pension as percentage of GDP per head) 
1980 1993 
Belgium 52.8 57.4 
Denmark 68.4 68.0 
France 60.0 72.8 
Germany 51.3 51.2 
Ireland 54.2 43.8 
Luxembourg 58.2 65.0 
Netherlands 70.6 76.4 
United Kingdom 56.9 63.9 
EU 12 56.2 62.0 
Greece 48.5 78.0 
Italy 62.1 77.6 
Portugal 41.3 42.1 
Spain 49.6 47.3 
Source: European Commission. 
Table 10: Health financing in Spain (1980-93) 
1980 % % GDP 1993 % % GDP* 
Direct taxes 7.6 --- --- -- 
Indirect tax. 6.4 --- --- --- 
Subtotal tax. 14 18 60 80 
Regarding the provision of health services, the public system has continued to purchase 
many of its hospital services from both private and charitable sectors. The expansion of the 
public coverage has not been matched with equivalent increases in resources. Let us 
remind that the increase of public expenditure on health during the period 1980-93 was 
merely 0.4 per cent. This figure seems to confirm the view that a universalisation of 
coverage has not been matched with an equivalent intensity on standards of care. Note that 
around 8 per cent of the population is covered by private health insurance (Freire, 1993). 
Some occupational schemes remain for groups of the hyper-protected core of the 
workforce. 
Public complaints towards the public health systems mostly relate to the bureaucratic-
administrative impediments that hinder the functioning of hospitals rather than the quality of 
the services being provided by them[11]. Furthermore, levels of efficiency vary according to 
the powers on health provision which have been decentralised to the 17 Autonomous 
Communities[12]. Some of these have implemented policies for the provision of services of 
a 'quasi-market' nature (Catalonia, Valencia), and have faced since then problems for the 
financing of their respective public health systems[13]. A rationalisation of health 
consumption -primarily, medicines-has come to the fore on the discussion of adapting 
levels of expenditure to socio-demographic changes (particularly in reference to citizens of 
65 years and over. See Table 11). There is need for longer time-series in order to evaluate 
with a degree of plausibility the effects of these reforms of hospital management, financial 
restraining and improvement of both efficiency and equality on health care. 
Social contr. 62 82 15 20 
Total Publ. 76 100 4.6 75 100 5.1 
Private insu. 3 12 2.5 10 
Direct pay. 21 88 22.5 90 
Total Priv. 24 100 2.6 25 100 2.7 
TOTAL 100 7.2 100 7.8 
* 1991. Source: Gallo de Puelles (1994: 865) and Rodríguez Cabrero (1994: 1478). 
Table 11: Projections on the evolution of population over 65 years of age for 
the EU countries (1980-2040)  
(percentage of the total national population) 
1980 1990 2000 2020 2040 
Austria 15.5 14.6 14.9 19.4 23.9 
Belgium 14.4 14.2 14.7 17.7 21.9 
Denmark 14.4 15.3 14.9 20.1 24.7 
Finland 12.0 13.1 14.4 21.7 23.1 
France 14.0 13.8 15.3 19.5 22.7 
Germany 15.5 15.5 17.1 21.7 27.6 
Ireland 10.7 11.3 11.1 12.6 16.9 
Luxembourg 13.5 14.6 16.7 20.2 22.0 
Netherlands 11.5 12.7 13.5 18.9 24.8 
Sweden 16.3 17.7 16.6 20.8 22.5 
U. Kingdom 14.9 15.1 14.5 16.2 20.4 
Greece 13.1 12.3 15.0 17.8 21.0 
Italy 13.5 13.8 15.3 19.4 24.2 
Portugal 10.2 11.8 13.5 15.6 20.4 
Spain 10.9 12.7 14.4 17.0 22.7 
Source: Council of Europe. 
Unemployment and employment promotion  
Unemployment rate in Spain is the highest in the European Union. According to the macro-
survey carried out every term in Spanish households (Encuesta de Población Activa, Active 
Population Survey), at the beginning of 1997 the number of unemployed amounted to 21.5 
per cent. Despite the fact that the EPA survey is methodologically sophisticated and 
technically accurate in its mechanisms of data collection and processing, a long-standing 
controversy has developed on whether its results are representative of the actual situation 
of the labour market in Spain. The persistence of a large 'hidden' tax-free economy in Spain 
largely distorts the reliability of the EPA data. Unquestionably, there is a sizeable portion of 
survey respondents who either hide their labour status or 'disguise' it (e.g. working within 
the informal sector). Some authors are of the opinion that the registered unemployed at the 
governmental job agencies of INEM[14] reflects more approximately the 'real' number of the 
unemployed in Spain (around 13% per cent of the total active working population in mid-
1997). Nevertheless, on comparing the diverging EPA and INEM figures the number of 
those citizens who simply do not bother to file a job demand at the INEM agencies is also to 
be taken into account.  
Given the high rate of unemployment in Spain some observers are puzzled by the relatively 
stable social situation in the country, particularly concerning sections like the young (among 
whom unemployment rates reach percentages of around 40 per cent and 45 per cent, 
respectively, for male and female of 20-24 years). Explanations for this less-traumatic 
phenomena associated to unemployment in Spain rest upon two considerations: (a) The 
considerable public expenditure concerned with unemployment benefits: 4.8 per cent of the 
GDP was allocated to this social expense, the highest percentage in all EU-12 countries in 
1993 (see Table 7); and (b) Support to the unemployed by familial and household networks 
of micro-solidarity. 
In the aftermath of the 1992-94 economic crisis the issue of implementing active 
employment polices has come to the fore in the discussions between the government, the 
Owners' Confederation (CEOE) and the most representative Trade Unions (CCOO and 
UGT). A widespread perception of the need to establish a new legal framework aimed at 
job creation, especially for the young, and limiting the burden of labour costs to improve 
competitiveness had been felt by the social partners. Prior to this, it is to be noted that the 
impact of deregulation on the growth of employment in Spain had been very limited. In fact, 
the legal framework did not seem to constitute in itself a compelling variable for the creation 
or destruction of employment in Spain. With the same labour legislation, half a million jobs 
were created in Spain in 1987 and 400.000 were destroyed in 1993 (Missé, 1997).  
Flexibility and deregulation were the main themes behind active labour market measures in 
the first half of the 1990s. But the immediate effect brought about by deregulatory policies 
was an exponential rise in the number of temporary and part-time occupations (nearly 40 
per cent of the total labour force). In 1996 only 4 per cent of all new jobs were established 
on a permanent basis. New contracts benefited from fiscal subventions and some 
consolidated the spurious practice of formalising de jure temporary contracts replacing de 
facto permanent working positions.  
In the period between the end of 1994 and 1996 the number of companies hiring 
employees increased significantly from 564.000 to 642.000; so did the number of part-time 
jobs (175.000). In order to alleviate a social perception of labour precariousness and avoid 
the perverse effects of the so-called 'junk' jobs both Employers' associations and Trade 
Unions (CCOO and UGT) engaged in negotiations and agreements to be put into law by 
the PP Government in May-June 1997.
Corporate welfare measures and fiscal incentives are to be met by Spanish public 
expenses favouring those companies hiring employees on a full-time and permanent basis. 
CCOO and UGT have given consent to legislation allowing a substantial reduction to be 
paid by the employers to newly-hired employees if they are made redundant in the future. 
These provisions are aimed at counteracting the effects of what seemed an unstoppable 
process of job precariousness since 1994. These policies are expected to have a greater 
impact in family-type companies and micro-enterprises. Rebate for employers' contributions 
to the Social Security will range between 40 per cent and 60 per cent. For those small 
businesses under the system of income tax modules -instead of the corporation tax regime-
- the welfare credits will affect new employment with no payments in the first two years[15]. 
The single most significant feature in the composition of the Spanish labour force is the 
increasing participation of women. This trend seems to correlate with the growing 
incorporation of women in formal education (see Table 6). In the last two periods of general 
growth of employment in Spain (1964-74 and 1985-1990), women's participation in the 
labour force increased vis-à-vis male workers. In 1969 there were 32 female workers for 
every 100 male employees[16]. This ratio increased up to 39/100 in 1974, to 41/100 in 
1985 and to 46/100 in 1990 (Garrido, 1994). In relative terms, women's participation is 
larger in the public sector than the private. Note that in 1964 there were 17 for every 100 
male public employees. The ratio jumped to 70/100 in 1991. Even more representative of 
this changing pattern is the fact that, within the age group of 25-29 years, the proportion of 
female public employees was 105 for every 100 male workers in 1990. Reasons for job 
security and stability appear to be paramount for women in such an age group. In contrast 
with the situation in Germany and United Kingdom, employment interruptions in Spain --and 
Southern Europe, as a whole-are motivated more by professional reasons and less by 
maternity concerns. This pattern translates into high continuity rates and less part-time jobs 
(Jurado & Naldini, 1996). 
A change in the priorities of greater numbers of women with respect to their traditional 
subordinate position within the labour market and their commitment to raising children has 
been taking place in the last two decades. This changing role of women within both labour 
market and households will have important repercussions for the future of the Spanish 
Welfare State. The generation born between 1950 and 1970 is characterised in the main by 
well-educated women committed to professional activities. This pattern is coupled with a 
postponement to give birth to their first children. Further, marriage rates have diminished as 
a result of unemployment, problems of matching expectations of 'good' jobs according to 
higher levels of qualifications, and rising costs of living particularly in urban areas. 
Transformations in family patterns are similar in other Southern European countries which 
are reflected in attitudes of ambivalent familialism by women(Flaquer, 1995; Saraceno, 
1995).  
Social assistance and 'targeting'  
The process of deepening the political and administrative decentralisation, according to the 
1978 Constitution, is the most compelling force behind the shaping of welfare development 
in Spain. De-concentration of social services has had a much larger impact than 
privatisation (Almeda & Sarasa , 1996). 
Plural Spain has gone through a substantial social, economic, and political transformation 
since the inception of the 1978 Constitution. The Estado de las Autonomías ("State of 
Autonomies") has transcended to a large extent the traditional cultural patterns of 
ethnoterritorial confrontation in Spain (Moreno, 1997a). In budgetary terms, variations were 
substantial in the period 1978-1991: central government expenditure decreased from 90 to 
65 per cent; regional government rose from zero to 22 per cent; and local government, from 
10 to 17 per cent. 
Let us remind that according to the 1978 Spanish Constitution, social assistance is a power 
of the 'exclusive competence' of the 17 Autonomous Communities. These have made use 
of these powers extensively for purposes mainly of institutional legitimisation. Of great 
relevance for our analysis has been the programmes of rentas mínimas (minimum income 
benefits) or, in other words, salario social (social salary). 
In order to combat poverty and situations of social exclusion, the 'Family Minimum Income' 
was introduced in the Basque Country in March 1998. This constituted a precedent and 
provoked a 'demonstration effect' in the subsequent programmes of minimum income 
benefits implemented in all 17 Comunidades Autónomas. Although showing a degree of 
diversity in policy design and coverage, programmes of 'minimum income' developed by the 
Spanish 'historical nationalities' and regions aim at combining cash benefits with policies of 
social insertion (employment promotion and vocation training schemes, primarily).  
The impact of these ab novo programmes of 'minimum income' have had a dramatic effect 
in the debate about the completion of a 'safety net' in Spain. They are quasi-universalistic 
entitlements sharing some common features which can be identified as follows: (a) Families 
are the units of reference even though individuals can be beneficiaries; (b) Means-tested 
criteria is related to a threshold of household income under which cash benefits are 
awarded (around two thirds of minimum wage); (c) Residence status of applicants is 
required (ranging from 1 to 10 years); (d) Periods of extension are available provided that 
beneficiaries have complied with social insertion activities and social needs remain the 
same (Aguilar, Gaviria & Laparra, 1995). (See Table 12 for basic data on minimum income 
programmes). 
Table 12: Minimum income programmes in Spain (1993)  
(by Autonomous Communities) 
% of basic non-
contributory pension 
# Beneficiaries Total # (including 
related schemes*) 
Andalusia 95.5 950 5,000 
Aragon 81.6 106 106 
Asturias 100.00 150 1,661 
Balearic Islands ---- ---- ---- 
Basque Country 99.2 11,786 16,486 
Canary Islands 81.6 1,683 1,683 
Cantabria 81.6 100 100 
Castile-La Mancha 111.4 1,224 4,307 
Castile and Leon 81.6 2,495 2,495 
Catalonia 100.6 7,000 7,000 
Extremadura 85.6 441 1,265 
Galicia 85.7 1,476 2,743 
La Rioja 94.3 205 205 
Madrid 101.9 10,996 10,996 
Murcia 92.4 500 580 
Navarre 100.6 997 1,460 
Valencia 100.0 1,873 1,873 
These meso-governmental initiatives have certainly stirred up welfare development in 
Spain. However, and due to their increasing financial difficulties, it remains to be seen 
whether these programmes will continue to be a priority for the regions. They may confront 
a situation of either requesting co-funding from the central government or containing the 
scope of their coverage benefits. 
In all future scenarios, the action by the regional and local government will be of decisive 
importance for welfare development in Spain. Indeed, the centre-periphery institutional 
interplay is a structuring variable which pre-determines to a great extent the diverse nature 
of welfare outcomes in contemporary Spain.  
Since 1988 concerted action of the three levels of government to establish a 
comprehensive network of community centres has been instrumental for the extension of 
social services to the population at large[17]. The Plan Concertado de Prestaciones 
Básicas de Servicios Sociales in municipalities was established in 1988[18] aiming at 
providing services at the municipal level for the following purposes: (a) Information and 
counselling; (b) Social and day care services[19] for the disabled and elderly; (c) Shelter for 
harassed women, single mothers, orphans or mistreated minors, and homeless; and (d) 
Prevention and social insertion.  
This network of community centres has overtaken much of the social system developed by 
the Catholic Church during the 1960s. In the period 1989-96, the PSOE Governments have 
not been opposed to lending support to private assistance and charities of a religious 
nature[20]. Nevertheless, they have often tended to favour NGOs of a secular nature, as 
well as the Red Cross and the powerful National Organization for the Blind (ONCE), a 
policy somewhat reversed by the PP Government since 1996. 
As in other South European countries the 'problem' with targeting is that social services and 
benefits do not always reach the needy or the citizens entitled to them. The mixed and 
fragmented nature of Southern welfare -both income related and universalistic-- makes the 
evaluation of welfare provision not an easy task. On assessing the 'Matthew Effect' there 
are two opposing views. One contends that the more the non-poor benefit, the more 
unequal the welfare state becomes. (Le Grand 1982: 137). The other sustains that allowing 
some predation of social outcomes by those not directly targeted tends to encourage 
coalition formation between least-favoured classes and sections of the middle class in 
support for continued welfare state policies (Korpi 1980: 305). In summary, both beneficial 
and detrimental effects of the 'Matthew Effect' are intertwined in a manner arduous to be 
unfold. Here lies one of the main analytical challenges for experts dealing with the case of 
the Southern Welfare.  
Future scenarios for Europe  
Economic problems faced by the European Union in order to adapt itself to the increasing 
competition within the Single Market and with respect to industrialised countries in south-
east Asia have led some authors to label the present situation as a 'frozen welfare 
landscape' (Esping-Andersen, 1994). 'Eurosclerosis' is also regarded as a major obstacle to 
economic progress as global competition intensifies (Taylor-Gooby, 1996). Implicit in these 
remarks is the quest for the achievement of a new model of development and growth within 
the international economic order. There is also an alternative prescription which proclaims 
Mean/Total 93.3 41,982 57,960 
* One-off emergency cash payments are also taken into account.  
Source: Aguilar, Gaviria & Laparra (pp. 90 and 654). 
the idea of a 'fortress Europe': the secession from the international world arena would 
preserve the maintenance of the European welfare regimes (Castells, 1996). An economic 
'wall' around EU member states would guarantee social rights achieved by generations of 
Europeans. It would also stimulate a balanced growth which, in turn, would create new 
employment coupled with job-sharing and the reduction of working time. Immigration would 
be tightly regulated. Undoubtedly this option would mean a U-turn in the cosmopolitan 
approach of the European culture (Moreno, 1997b). 
The lingering 'demise' of the nation-state as main source of economic planning seems more 
than plausible. Financial globalisation maximises speculation by a handful of monetary 
strategists in banks, investment funds, financial trusts, and the like. A concerted effort 
within the European Union is required if goals for the preservation of social solidarity 
institutions are to be accomplished. The possibility of establishing a new 'social contract' is 
at stake (Ferrera, 1996b; Rodríguez-Cabrero, 1997). This very much depends on the 
internalisation of values of compassion and solidarity by the citizenship at large and, in 
particular, by the bulk of the middle classes. Opting for the principles of social justice would 
be dependent on each citizen being able to place him or herself in the social position of any 
other person, and particularly the marginalized (Rawls, 1971). The realisation of this point is 
essential if welfare systems of solidarity characteristic of the European societies are to be 
revitalised. 
Notes 
1 According to a 1996 national survey, 46.3 per cent of Spaniards agreed that, "The State is responsible for 
each and every one of its citizens, and has the duty to help them to solve their problems"; 35.7 also agreed 
that "The State is only responsible for the well being of least-favoured citizens", and 13.0 per cent were of the 
opinion that "Citizens are responsible themselves for their own well-being and have the duty to sort out their 
own problems" (Don't knows: 5.1 per cent. CIS, 1996).  
2 This 'halo effect' refers to the assertion in the Gospel according to Matthew: "For whomsoever hath, to him 
shall be given, and he shall have more abundance; but whomsoever hath not, from him shall be taken away 
even that he hath" (13:12).  
3 With an increasing critical voice from the Spanish Communist Party integrated in the electoral coalition 
United Left (Izquierda Unida).  
4 At the end of 1996, Spain ranked seventh in EU-15 with 69.6 per cent. Net borrowing requirement was 4.4 
% of GDP which compared with highest rates for Greece (7.4 per cent) and Italy (6.7 per cent), and lowest for 
Luxembourg (-1.8 per cent) and Ireland (0.9 per cent).  
5 Note that around 12 per cent of the total public expenditure is paid to concerted private schools. Together 
with the non-concerted private education they both covered 31 per cent of all student population in 1990 
(38.6, pre-school; 34.5 per cent, elementary; 28.7 per cent, middle; and 8.1 per cent, university).  
6 General requirements are (a) Residence in Spain during the 5 years, and the last 2 prior to the concession 
of the pensions; and (b) lack of resources (to be determined by means testing).  
7 However the minimum salary decreased from 77.5 per cent of the per capita GDP in1980 to 52.4 per cent in 
1992.  
8 Projections for the year 2020 estimate that 18.3 per cent of the total population of Spain will be over 65 
years of age (see Table 11).  
9 In Italy it may be improper to speak of a 'selfish' old-age generation but, according to F. Castles and M. 
Ferrera, "..clearly there is a set of life-cycle distributions which strongly favour the interests of the old" (1996: 
175).  
10 Fraud was carried out by trying to cover up labour cases of various kinds: e.g. early retirement or aged 
unemployed.  
11 There has been a traditional emphasis on hospital care instead of primary attention. This hospital-centred 
pattern of health care is ingrained in some public perception which tends to disregard services at the primary 
level. Such a popular feeling has perverse 'bureaucratic' effects as regards the overcrowding of public 
hospitals.  
12 By 1991 over half of health spending was managed by both 'historical nationalities' (Basque Country, 
Catalonia, and Galicia) and regions (Andalusia, Aragon, Asturias, Balearic Island, Canary Islands, Cantabria, 
Castille and Leon, Castille-La Mancha, Extremadura, La Rioja, Madrid, Murcia, Navarre, and Valencia).  
13 This issue became a priority for the nationalist Catalan coalition, Convergència i Uniò, in order to lend 
legislative support to the minority PP Government after 1996.  
14 The Spanish INEM (National Institute for Employment) classify as registered unemployed all those citizens 
who have filed a job demand in any of its agencies and who legally qualify as unemployed. Thus, those who 
have a 'visible' job, the disabled or the students under the age of 25 are excluded. In order to be eligible to 
unemployment and social assistance benefits citizens must comply with the requisite of being registered at 
the INEM agencies.  
15 In implementing this new legislation, the political input of the Catalan nationalists (CiU), who have 
supported the minority PP Government in the Spanish Parliament after the 1996 General Election, is to be 
underlined. Shop-keepers and owners of small businesses in Catalonia have traditionally been faithful and 
strong supporters of the Catalan electoral coalition.  
16 In 1975 there were nearly 1 million public employees in Spain. At the beginning of 1996 the corresponding 
figure was nearly 1,800,000.  
17 The same year the Ministry of Social Affairs was first created by the PSOE Government. In 1996 the PP 
Government integrated it into the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.  
18 Central, regional and local authorities have contributed respectively 42 per cent, 33 per cent and 25 per 
cent to the Plan. It has covered all Autonomous Communities except the Basque Country and Navarre. The 
latter maintain a regime of fiscal quasi-independence with respect to the central Treasury (by means of 
collecting all taxes and handing over to the central administration an agreed amount as cupo, or quota, in 
payment for the general services of the state). This arrangement has enabled the Basque Country and 
Navarre to enjoy a higher level of social spending.  
19 These can be defined as a domain within which organised services are provided to strengthen personal 
autonomy of both carers and often care receivers. Note that residential provision of the elderly reached 
around 2 per cent of citizens over 65 years of age. However, residences privately run for the elderly have 
greatly expanded in recent years.  
20 Note that by 1988, Caritas, the charitable organization run by the Roman Catholic Church, programmed 
8,353 million Pesetas to its social programme, an amount which was just above 9 per cent of the newly 
created Ministry of Social Affairs' budget (Rodríguez-Cabrero, 1990). Note that by 1988, Caritas, the 
charitable organization run by the Roman Catholic Church, programmed 8,353 million Pesetas to its social 
programme, an amount which was just above 9 per cent of the newly created Ministry of Social Affairs' budget 
(Rodríguez-Cabrero, 1990).   
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